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Leaving or Staying:
Inter-Provincial Migration
in Vietnam
Phuong Nguyen-Hoang
Syracuse University and the University of Iowa
John McPeak
Syracuse University
Internal migration has several policy implications for economic growth and
development for developing countries in general and for the fast growing
low-income country of Vietnam in particular. Little research has been done,
however, on inter-provincial migration in Vietnam. This study makes two
major contributions to the migration and development literature in terms of
the datasets and policy-relevant estimation approach. It is the first paper to
use the annual survey data on migration published by Vietnam’s General
Statistics Office. This study also adopts a functional form to accommodate the
flexibility of income’s elasticity. Income, together with urban unemployment
rates, are endogenously estimated with instruments that prove to be strong
and valid. The inclusion of policy-relevant variables provides empirical
findings that can make migration policy in Vietnam better-informed. Specifi-
cally, Vietnamese migrants are influenced primarily by moving costs, ex-
pected income differentials, disparity in the quality of public services offered
by provinces, and the demographic composition at destination and source.
This paper’s findings provide new insight for migration policy options, and
suggest that the government adopt a holistic policy approach to maximize
the benefits and minimize the costs associated with internal migration.
Introduction
Internal migration has several policy implications for economic growth and
development for developing countries. This is particularly true of Vietnam
– a fast-growing, low-income country. Inter-provincial migration has been
an important trend in Vietnam since the adoption of the economic reform
or Doi Moi  in 1986. According to the 1999 Census, nearly 4.5 million people,
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1895490
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or 6.5 percent  of the population over five years of age, changed their place
of residence between 1994 and 1999 (Dang et al., 2003: i).1 Although research
on internal migration in both developing and developed countries is huge,
there have been only two quantitative studies on  internal migration in
Vietnam (Dang et al., 1997; Phan and Coxhead, 2010).2 This paper  aims to
fill the gap in the literature with the following two principal contributions.
First, while the two quantitative studies on Vietnam’s migration noted
above employed decennial Census data, this is the first paper that used the
annual survey data released by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam
(GSO). While censuses are conducted every ten years, data from annual
surveys can help see migration trends for between-Census years. The
second contribution is that this paper presents an estimation approach with
three distinct features. First, it has a flexible functional form that allows
migration’s income elasticity to vary as income increases. Second, we
treated both income and unemployment rates as potentially endogenous
variables in the model. Third, in contrast to Phan and Coxhead (2010), who
included dummy variables to control for provincial characteristics, our
model incorporated policy-relevant variables, thus providing empirical
findings that can be used to develop a better-informed migration policy in
Vietnam. Policy relevant variables such as costs of moving, differentials in
expected income, quality of public services, and  demographic characteris-
tics between source and destination areas all have significant impacts on
migration flows.
The paper proceeds as follows: a brief overview of migration trends
since the country’s reunification in 1975;  the development of a modeling
framework on inter-provincial migration flows;  a description of data and
measures used for econometric estimations; interpretation and discussions
of regression results;  policy implications; and concludes with reflections on
the study’s contributions.
Overview of Migration Trends
As of 2006, the estimated population of Vietnam was 84,155,800 million
people (GSO, 2007). This figure represents approximately a 10.3 percent
increase from over 76 million people in the 1999 Census. The share of males
and females in the total population  has been quite steady at about 49 and
1 The trend would be larger because the numbers did not include short-term migration.
2 We did not include other qualitative and descriptive papers (Dang et al., 2003; Desbarats,
1987; Zhang et al., 2006) and other migration-related studies (White et al., 2001).
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51 percent, respectively, over the past decade. Figure 1 indicates that the
percentage of people living in urban areas has steadily increased since 1990.
Although the increase in the average population density from 194 persons/
km2 in 1989 to 231 persons/km2 in 1999 (Dang et al., 2003) to 254 persons/
km2 in 2006 places Vietnam among the countries of highest densities in the
Asia-Pacific region,  population density varies significantly from one area
to another. For example, Ho Chi Minh City was 83 times more densely
populated in 2006 than  the mountainous province of Lai Chau.
The current population distribution reflects a long history of migration.
As a matter of fact, Vietnam’s four-thousand-year-long history with numer-
ous wars familiarized the Vietnamese people with migration. Since an
overview of such a long history is beyond the scope of this paper, we focused
more on inter-provincial migration after the country’s reunification in
1975.3 The government encouraged large-scale internal movements after
3 See Dang et al. (1997) for a description of migration in earlier periods.
SOURCE: World Development Indicators
FIGURE 1
URBANIZATION IN VIETNAM BETWEEN 1990 AND 2006
SOURCE: World Development Indicators
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1975 and in the early 1980s. The government ambitiously aimed at redistrib-
uting approximately one-fifth of the total population by the end of the
century (Desbarats, 1987). The resettlements during this period were driven
by both security and economic reasons. First, shortly after the reunification
of the country, Vietnam was involved in Cambodia’s affairs in the south and
fought against China in the north. Second, resettlements were also aimed at
releasing population pressures in urban centers and densely populated
river deltas. While population pressure was very high in the north, popula-
tion density was much lower in the south and the Central Highlands. The
government repatriated southern people back into their native villages in
the wake of reunification in 1975 and encouraged the massive migration of
people into resettlement sites (often known as the New Economic Zones, or
NEZs) in rural areas. An individual could volunteer to work on a state farm
or forestry enterprise in the NEZs (Hardy, 2000). In general, the government’s
land-based relocation policy in the 1980s focused primarily on rural-to-
rural and urban-to-rural migration (Dang et al., 2003:2).
Direct government intervention in migration policy was not particu-
larly successful. The substantial decline in migration flows sprang from the
incompatibility between migration objectives and the development of the
NEZs, the high costs of building new social infrastructure, and the growing
shortage of readily cleared lands for cultivation (Dang et al., 2003). Not only
did fewer people move to NEZs, but existing residents started to leave. As
many as half of the migrants to the NEZs moved again or returned to their
place of origin soon after they arrived (Desbarats, 1987). Lack of physical
and social infrastructure, poor health services and food insecurity were
among the factors that boosted the outflows. Recognizing the shortcoming
of early resettlement programs, the government attempted to supplement
subsequent migration policies with socio-economic development invest-
ments, such as reforestation programs. However,  lack of financial resources
and other administrative problems  considerably slowed down the pace of
resettlement (Phan and Coxhead, 2010).
By 1987, these organized migration policies had been completely aban-
doned. Migration since then  is best characterized as spontaneous internal
migration flows (Déry, 2000). Unlike the previous patterns of rural-to-rural
and urban-to-rural migration, spontaneous migration in recent years is
mostly from rural to urban areas. Such migration has been facilitated by
three principal factors. First, the household registration system has been
greatly relaxed, allowing migrants some access to essential goods, resi-
dence, and employment in major cities. People no longer have to depend on
government subsidies and rationing for their daily necessities in urban
places (Dang et al., 2003). Second, government policies not originally
designed to influence migration have nonetheless substantially influenced
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migration flows. For example, the 1988 Resolution 10, in which cooperative
land was redistributed directly to households, stimulated agricultural
capacity to the fullest. This was followed by the 1993 Land Law, whereby
households were given a certificate verifying their long-term rights to
transfer, exchange, mortgage, lease and inherit their land plots to others
(Scott, 2000). Land ownership  enabled people to “sell (and therefore leave)
and buy (and therefore arrive)” (Hardy and Turner, 2000). In addition, the
market-driven economy initiated by Doi Moi  in 1986 has attracted  consi-
derable foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows which were distributed
unequally throughout the country. Table 1 shows that Ho Chi Minh City
received 155 times more in FDI than  provinces in the Northwest region.
Such huge inter-provincial disparities in FDI flows, and thus economic
growth, underlie the impetus for internal migration for better economic
opportunities.
Figure 2 provides an overall pattern of inter-provincial migration
during the five years prior to the 2009 Census using net migration ratios that
are defined as [((in-migrants – out-migrants)/total potential migrants)*
1,000].4 This figure shows that economically advantaged and more urban
TABLE 1
REGISTERED FDI CAPITAL IN THE PERIOD 1986-2006 BY REGION AND THE TWO
LARGEST CITIES (MILLION USD)
Regions and cities Averagea Totala
Regions
Red River Delta 767.96 7679.60
North East 222.29 2445.20
North West 28.85 115.40
North Central Coast 245.45 1472.70
South Central Coast 879.30 5275.80
Central Highlands 208.26 1041.30
South  East 3491.64 24441.50
Mekong River Delta 178.10 2315.30
Two largest cities
Ha Noi 12561.6
Ho Chi Minh City 17895.6
SOURCE: General Statistics Office
NOTE: a The figures do not include those of the two largest cities.
4 Potential migrants are defined as those who are five years of age or older.
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FIGURE 2
PROVINCES' NET MIGRATION RATIOS DURING THE FIVE YEARS BEFORE 2009
SOURCE: Central Census Steering Committee (2010)
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mi j
POPi j
Di j
provinces, such as Binh Duong, Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, Dong Nai and
Ha Noi, have the highest positive net migration ratios. More specifically,
Binh Duong’s net migration ratio of 340 percent indicates that one in five
people living in this province in 2009 migrated from elsewhere during the
earlier five years (Central Census Steering Committee, 2010). By contrast,
most of the provinces in the Mekong River Delta and Central Coast have
more out-migrants than in-migrants. More specifically, the provinces with
the highest negative migration ratios of over -60 percent are Thanh Hoa, Ben
Tre and Ha Tinh (Central Census Steering Committee, 2010).
Modeling Inter-provincial Migration
Modeling migration decisions  have a long history in development econom-
ics (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1969). Stillwell (2008) provides an
overview of inter-regional migration modeling. He describes two core
approaches in the literature a micro approach based on understanding
decisions made by individuals or households, and a macro approach that
considers aggregate population flows. This study is based on the macro
view, where the unit of analysis is a province at a given point in time.5
Our empirical estimation is based on the modified version of the
‘gravity model’ commonly used in the migration literature (Greenwood,
1997). The original gravity model is similar to Newton’s law of universal
gravity. Migration is related positively to the size of relevant origin and
destination populations, and negatively to distance. In other words,  where
k  is a constant,          is the number of people that migrate from a province
of origin, i, to another province of destination,  j, at time t. While
represents the population sizes6 of the host and source provinces, respec-
tively,       indicates the distance between two provinces in equation (1).
Migration is related positively to the size of relevant origin and destination
5 We adopted this macro view partly because Phan and Coxhead (2010) used a method
similar to the one adopted in this study. There is an interest in keeping the methods similar since
the context of the two studies is the same.
6 The concern over the possible endogeneity of population on migration is not warranted
because the proportion of migrants in the total population is still very small in Vietnam. Also,
none of the internal migration studies we reviewed treated total population as endogenous.
mi j t = k x
POPαi j t
Dϕi j
(1)
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populations, and negatively to distance. More densely populated areas
attract more in-migrants and stimulate more out-migrants. Since potential
migrants have to weigh the costs and benefits associated with moving from
one province to another, distance (Dij) is often used as a proxy for the
moving costs between the source and host provinces.7 Distance that plays an
important role in many types of migration such as primary, repeat, return,
retirement, job transfer, and job search (Cushing and Poot, 2004) is expected
to have a negative impact on migration flows. The farther the provinces are
from each other, the lower the migration flows between them. The negative
effect of distance on migration flows could also reflect either diminishing
information on job opportunities or increasing psychic costs (Schwartz,
1973).
We transformed the original gravity model into a logarithmic form as
in equation (2).
The log specification has several advantages (Wooldridge, 2003) and
was commonly used in previous migration studies.8 It controls for possible
heteroskedasticity and the coefficients of continuous variables can be
interpreted as elasticities. Many versions of the gravity model specify  as a
constant. However, to investigate how factors other than population and
distance affect migration flows, we specify ln(k) as a function of relevant
shifters that change the gravity force between the two provinces.
where γ is a constant. Xijt  represents control variables. Income in the private
sector (Yijt) measured by the average monthly income, and urban unem-
ployment rates (Uijt) at origin and destination at time t are the two key
7 Since the key variable, distance, does not vary across time, the model does not include
provincial fixed effects. Also, since the migration data are taken in two consecutive years, other
time-dependent factors could present very little changes to have a significant effect on the
dependent variable. As will be shown later, we will employ an instrumental variable for the
key variable to address the possible endogeneity of the independent variables with the
provinces' unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
8 White and Lindstrom (2005) specify a log-linear functional form for estimating the
probability of moving at the individual level. Our use of the log-log (or double-log) specifica-
tion is more common when using data sets containing geographically aggregated variables
(Fan, 2005; Juarez, 2000; Shen, 1999).
ln mijt = ln (k) + αlnPOPijt  − ϕlnDij  (2)
ln k = γ + λlnYijt + η (lnYijt)
2 + θ (ln) Uijt + δ (ln)Xijt   (3)
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variables in this model extension. The inclusion of the two variables follows
Todaro’s (1976) model in which he modified his original migration model
by including urban unemployment rates together with income. One of the
main motives for migration is the income/wage differentials between
origin and destination. Economically rational people will choose to live in
a place where they can maximize their income-generating ability. The add-
ition of the squared term of the log of income (lnYijt)
2, indicates that the
effects of income on migration inflows and outflows are potentially non-
linear.9 If an increase in income at the destination is not large enough to
cover  substantial fixed costs of moving,  migration then becomes unappeal-
ing to potential migrants. Once income differential goes beyond a certain
threshold, greater income is expected to stimulate greater in-migration
flows.
By the same token, an increase in real wages in the origin province
might have two opposing effects. On the one hand, the push effect indicates
that the poorer the people at the origin relative to the destination, the
stronger the incentive to migrate. On the other hand, poorer people are less
able to have access to information  about the destination and/or to with-
stand the cash flow shocks associated with  migration. As a result, migration
can be constrained by the availability of financial resources needed to invest
in the move (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). This is commonly known as the
liquidity constraint effect. While the liquidity constraint effect is hypoth-
esized to dominate the push effect at lower levels of income, the push effect
is dominant at higher income levels (Feder, 1982). Overall, the quadratic
specification of the logged income is intended to test the expected non-
linear effects of income on both in-migration and out-migration.
However, people take into consideration not only income but also the
probability of finding a job represented by urban unemployment rates
(Uijt). The rates are theoretically predicted to attract smaller migration
inflows at destination and to send more out-migrants at origin. The paren-
theses before (Uijt) indicate that we employ both specifications, with and
without logarithmic transformation, of urban unemployment rates. While
the log of the unemployment rates makes them functionally consistent with
other variables, we want to see if a specification without the log transforma-
9 The squared log specification allows us to estimate the elasticity of income to change as
a function of migration flows. As noted in Greene (2002) and Wooldridge (2003), this
specification is widely used in econometric studies.  It is also  used in internal migration studies
(Andrienko and Guriev, 2004; Aslund, 2005), education  research (Duncombe and Yinger, 2005,
2007) with cost per pupil being a function of the log of enrollment and its squared value, and
in other social science research (Oliver, 1999).
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tion of unemployment rates and other control percentage variables in vector
X would produce the same results.10
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) produces
Based on equation (4), equation (5) is specified for empirical estimation.
where ε is the error term, and μt is the time dummy equal to 1 for 2005 and
0 for 2004 to control for macroeconomic temporal shocks affecting all
provinces. Except for distance, the squared income at origin, and the time
dummy, all other variables in equation (5) that will be explained at great
lengths in the following paragraphs are entered in pairs of the host and
source provinces. The model reflects the fact that people migrate in re-
sponse to differential economic opportunities, location-specific amenities
and demographic characteristics.
Econometric issues arise in the estimation of variables representing
income and unemployment rates. Income and unemployment rates may
endogenously respond to migration. These problems require treating vari-
ables of income and employment rates endogenous in equation (5) (Blanchard
et al., 1992; Treyz et al., 1993). To eliminate the endogeneity bias of the
income variables and unemployment rates, we employed the Fuller-k
estimator (k=4) (Fuller, 1977) with instrumental variables (IVs).11 The meth-
odological difficulty is to find valid and strong IVs. Their validity and
strength must pass several tests. First, they should have a conceptual link
with the endogenous explanatory variables. The instruments for urban
unemployment rates are the intergovernmental transfers from the central
government to provinces and measures of provincial efforts in labor train-
ing. Conceptually, they are highly correlated with unemployment.12 The
10 One might wonder why instead of percentages, we did not directly use the absolute
numbers, or the numerators of the proportions. As a matter of fact, neither of these options
would have made any difference because we have already controlled for total population, thus
the denominator, in equation (5).
11 Andrews and Stock (2007)demonstrate that relative to the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS)
estimation, the Fuller-k estimator is less subject to the bias associated with weak instruments.
In fact, our strong instruments make our 2SLS results almost the same as those with the Fuller-
k estimation.
12 Pearl (2000) showed that the causal direction between the endogenous and an IV is
irrelevant in examining the validity of the IV.
ln mijt = γ  + αlnPOPijt - ϕlnDij + λlnYijt + η(lnYit)
2 + θ (ln) Uijt + δ (ln) Xijt       (4)
ln mijt = γ  + αlnPOPijt - ϕlnDij + λlnYijt + η(lnYit)
2 + θ (ln)Uijt + δ (ln) Xijt + μt + ε     (5)
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instrument for the average monthly private income is the average monthly
income in the government sector. The two variables are conceptually
correlated for two reasons. First, government employees are mobile and can
work in the private sector. Therefore, government bodies need to offer
salaries relatively comparable to private sector wages to attract and retain
their employees. Second, the so-called “Baumol effect” posits that salaries
in sectors with productivity gains (usually private sector) cause increases in
the government sector (Baumol and Bowen, 1966).
The second test is that the instruments should be correlated with the
endogenous variables but not with the error term ε. In other words, they are
not explanatory variables in the estimation equation (5). The instrument of
income can be considered as exogenous when the large majority of migrants
are driven more by income in the private, rather than the public sector.
Theoretically, intergovernmental transfers, as one of the two instruments
for unemployment rates, are not likely to have a discernible direct impact
on migration for two reasons.13 First, migrants are responsive to public
expenditures that depend on provinces’ revenues,  including transfers. As
long as we control directly for provinces’ public expenditures in equation
(5), the IV is still independent of the error term.14 Second, the case for the
exogeneity of intergovernmental transfers is even stronger in Vietnam
where  information about them is not easily accessible and is only available
online. Also, there is a two-year lag to get the published information. All in
all, migrants, the majority of whom are farmers, are highly unlikely to be
directly driven by the transfers. Given the exogeneity of the first instrument,
we conducted over-identifying tests on the second instrument.  Hansen’s J
statistic in the over-identification test of the two instruments with robust
errors is not statistically significant; put differently, the instruments are
believed to be valid.
Finally, the IVs must be put to the third test for their strength. Although
the Fuller-k estimation is less subject to weak instruments, stronger IVs are
better. The F-statistics for the first stage of the regressions range between 40
and 120. The values are statistically significant under all weak-instrument
tests reported by Stata.
 Following Fields’ (1976)  argument that the unemployment rate is an
imperfect indicator of provincial labor market opportunities, several other
13 Our confidence in the exogeneity of this IV is strengthened as it was already used in
Andrienko and Guriev (2004).
14 See Pearl (2000) for further discussions.
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variables need to be incorporated and represented by vector X in equation
(5). The first group of these variables represents the size of the urban
population, industrial and agricultural sector structures. Controlling for
urban unemployment rates, provinces with a larger urban population can
draw more in-migrants (Dang et al., 1997; Vogler and Rotte, 2000). There
could, however, be a possible endogeneity caused by the reverse effect of
migration flows on the urban population. The endogeneity may be more
serious if urban population growth comes mostly from migration flows
rather than natural growth (Zhang and Song, 2003). This is, however, not the
case for Vietnam in the sample years when annual migration accounts
maximally for only two and 0.4 percent of provinces’ urban population and
total population, respectively. Plus, models without the share of urban
population produce trivially different results and are thus not reported.
A sizeable industrial sector at the destination boosts the chances for
migrants to find nonfarm employment. Industrial firms provide not only
work for educated and skilled people but also jobs for unskilled rural
laborers, at least on a short-term basis (Dang et al., 1997:325). Measures of
industrial development include industrial output per capita, and the share
of population working in industrial firms. The inclusion of the latter is
justified on the grounds that individuals are likely to move to provinces
where internal labor markets are dynamic at the firm level, regardless of
high unemployment (Hamalainen and Bockerman, 2004). All else being
equal, the higher the values of the two variables, the greater the migration
inflows and the smaller the migration outflows.
The second group of variables includes proxies for the level of infra-
structure development measured by the number of landline telephones per
thousand people, and for the quality of public services offered by provinces.
In the local public finance literature, people ‘vote with their feet’ to choose
the community that provides the optimal bundle of taxes and public
services (Tiebout, 1956). It is noteworthy that provincial governments in
Vietnam do not have autonomy over tax rates or base. Accordingly, there is
no difference in payable taxes that migrants need to take into their migration
consideration. The second component in the bundle that matters more to
migrants in Vietnam is public services. Migrants are likely to be attracted
more to provinces that offer public services of higher quality. In other
words, provinces with public services of superior quality attract more in-
migrants and generate less out-migration. Following this line of argument,
we included provinces’ total public expenditures per capita and two proxies
for the quality of public education and health care – the two most important
public services that migrants usually take into migration consideration.
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The third group of variables consists of local-specific demographic
characteristics that may significantly influence migration flows. They are
the shares of college graduates, senior citizens, school-aged people and
ethnic minority people. Since the Kinh15 compose the largest of the 54 eth-
nic groups in Vietnam, the last variable indicates the percentage of those
belonging  to the other 53 ethnic minorities.
Finally, the hypotheses in equation (5) are tested with robust standard
errors because given considerable diversity among provinces in Vietnam,
there could be substantial heterogeneity at the provincial level even with the
of the log-log functional form.
Data and Measures
The main dependent variable is taken from the Surveys on Changes in
Population, Labor and Family Planning conducted by the General Statistics
Office of Vietnam (GSO) in 2004 and 2005 (see Table 2 for descriptive
statistics). The survey’s sampling method combines systematic and strati-
fied sampling approaches. Each province or city has a sample size of around
26,000 households scattered around 60 survey areas. The nationwide sample
which includes 1.6 million people (or two percent of the total population) is
then extrapolated for the whole population with sophisticated weighting
techniques.16 The surveys define a migrant to be a person whose permanent
place of residence twelve months before the survey interview was in a
different province.
The characteristics of the regions are used as regressors to predict the
migration flows between provinces. Distance between provinces is mea-
sured as the bus distance in kilometers between receiving and sending
provinces.17 In addition, the provinces differ in economic dimensions in
ways that may influence migration flows. The websites of the GSO supply
data on  industrial and agricultural production, FDI inflows, labor forces in
15 The national language of Vietnamese is that of the Kinh ethnic group.
16 Lucas (1997) indicates that the mobility data at hand is unable to address the issue of
circular migration and inner-provincial mobility. However, while inner-provincial mobility is
not of interest to the current paper,  we can reasonably assume that circular migration does not
create any major bias in the data. One might be concerned about possible measurement errors
of this dependent variable caused by the data-processing procedures. The major problem with
the dependent variable’s measurement errors is larger error variances than when no error
occurs. However, as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with the independent
variables, there will be no estimation bias (Wooldridge, 2003).
17 We are highly appreciative of Diep Phan for sharing the data. The same data were also
used in Phan and Coxhead (2010).
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, POOLED CROSS-SECTIONS 2004-2005
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Log of migration flows 4.7852 1.3203 1.3863 9.6043
Log of distance (km) 5.9341 1.1318 2.9957 8.3102
Log of total population 13.9639 0.6132 12.5951 15.5924
Log of average monthly income 7.0447 0.1793 6.5586 7.5783
Squared log of average income 49.6598 2.5384 43.0155 57.4306
Urban unemployment rates (%) 5.3232 0.7859 3.3800 7.1200
Shares of urban population 25.50 0.1875 0.0722 0.8622
Log of production output per capita -3.9141 1.1598 -6.6581 -1.2468
Shares of population in industrial firms 7.0237 9.4940 1.1434 47.5062
Log of agricultural output per capita -6.5527 0.6492 -8.2836 -5.3555
Log of total public expenditures per capita
(in VND millions) 0.3826 0.4348 -0.3642 1.7230
Student performance index 92.4263 5.4667 74.8750 99.8350
Log of medical staff per thousand people -11.6648 0.6477 -13.0653 -10.5731
Log of telephone sets per thousand people -9.3201 0.6115 -10.3799 -7.7662
Percent of ethnic minority people 19.6538 26.8393 0.0408 95.2539
Percent of college graduates 2.4449 2.5971 0.5552 15.8194
Percent of senior citizens 8.6879 2.2369 3.1260 13.1602
Percent of students 0.0825 0.0182 0.0338 0.1270
Instruments for income
Log of average monthly income in the
public sector 6.0738 0.3504 5.3739 7.0603
Squared log of average monthly income in the
public sector 37.0142 4.3675 28.8787 49.8479
Instruments for urban unemployment rates
Log of intergovernmental transfers per capita -0.8099 1.0414 -3.3005 1.1242
Squared log of intergovernmental transfers
per capita 1.7400 2.7188 0.0006 10.8936
Indexes for provincial efforts in labor training 5.3336 1.4060 1.9900 9.6000
Squared indexes for provincial efforts
in labor training 30.4235 16.2098 3.9601 92.1600
Number of observations 3676
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industrial firms, urban unemployment rates, and average monthly income
in the private sector (together with its instrument of the average monthly
income in the public sector). The provinces can differ in population size,
which is akin to ‘mass’ in the original gravity model, and also may differ in
terms of where the population is concentrated within each province, which
is measured using data on urban population. The characteristics of the
population in the respective provinces may influence migration flows; the
1999 Census offers data on the share of college graduates and the percent of
ethnic minority people in the provinces. The Ministry of Labor, Invalids,
and Social Affairs (2006) provides data on the shares of population pursuing
educational degrees of all levels and of senior citizens aged 65 and above.
Social services and infrastructure may influence migration flows, for
which we use graduation rates, prevalence of medical staff, and number of
landline telephones. The student performance index is the average gradu-
ation rates of lower and upper secondary school levels.18 Data on public
expenditures are retrieved from the websites of the Ministry of Finance.
They provide data on provinces’ total public expenditures19 as a proxy for
location-specific spending on public services,20 and intergovernmental
transfers used as the first instrument for unemployment rates. The transfers
that are intended to compensate for inter-provincial disparity in fiscal
capacity come into two categories. The first type is conditional or targeted
transfers. These transfers are made for the implementation of national
targeted programs in areas like poverty reduction, housing, and vaccina-
tion. Provinces also receive this type of transfers in cases of unexpected
national disasters or adverse socio-economic event (Martinez-Vazquez and
Gomez, 2005). The second type is unconditional “balancing” transfers.
These transfers are supposed to balance between expenditure needs and
locally generated revenue, thus generating greater horizontal fiscal equity.
The instrument employs the sum of the two categories of transfers.
The second instrument, a measure of provincial efforts in labor training,
is derived from the Vietnam Provincial Competiveness Index (PCI) (Viet-
18 We did not include primary graduation rates because there is very little variation in the
rates across provinces.
19 The measure does not include intra-provincial transfers from higher to lower levels of
governments. Note that Vietnam is characterized by four levels of government: central,
provinces, districts and communes.
20 Data are not available for the detailed composition of expenditures. Some studies use
disaggregated expenditure data to see the degree to which migrants  respond to  how
governments sectorally spend rather than about the total expenditures themselves (Day and
Winer, 2006).
488 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL
nam Competitiveness Initiative, 2005; 2006). The indexes are intended to
assess “efforts to help overcome skills shortages at the provincial level”
(VNCI, 2006:3).21 The 2004 PCI  surveyed 42 provinces  while the 2005 PCI
surveyed all 64 provinces in Vietnam. Since the PCI was not computed until
2004, the missing data for 2004 take the values of the 2005 survey. This
sensible, though imperfect, extrapolation procedure provides a relatively
accurate measure of provincial governments’ efforts in labor training. Small
changes in the index are observed across provinces between the 2004 and
2005 survey. Two years is a considerably short time period for provinces to
substantially progress or decline.
Overall, in our regressions, we attempted to reveal patterns on how
migration flows between provinces are influenced by the following: differ-
ences in the characteristics of the economies in the respective provinces;
differences in the population profile of the respective provinces; differences
in the public services characterizing the respective provinces; and to deter-
mine to what extent all these influences are mediated by the physical
distance between provinces that is fundamental to the gravity model
approach to migration studies.
Results and Discussions
Table 3 presents regression results from two models where the dependent
variable captures migration flows between provinces for the years 2004 and
2005. While Model 1 is estimated with all variables in log transformation,
percentage variables in Model 2 are left untransformed. The results of both
models are quite similar. The  major message conveyed by Table 3 is that
moving costs, differentials in expected income and in the quality of public
services delivered by provincial governments are what Vietnamese mi-
grants take into consideration when making migration decisions. Plus,
demographic factors are found to be determinants of migration patterns.
The first panel of the table reports the significant impact of the two
“gravity” factors of distance and population on migration patterns. Specifi-
cally, distance as a major proxy of moving costs has a highly negative and
significant effect on migration flows. A 1.0 percent increase in bus distance
leads to an approximately 0.29 percent decrease in migration flows. This
elasticity is bigger in absolute terms than the 0.12 estimated in Dang et al.
(1997) but smaller than the 0.43 elasticity reported in Phan and Coxhead
(2010). Our estimation in general indicates that Vietnamese migrants are
much less sensitive to distance relative to migrants in both developed and
21 Provinces are ranked from 1 to 10 with 10 as the best on this index.
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developing countries of smaller or similar size.22 The elasticity of distance is
still smaller compared to studies  in larger countries such as Canada, Russia
or China.23
Population size also has highly significant effects on migration inflows
and outflows. While people tend to migrate to more populous provinces,
these provinces send more out-migrants too. What should be noted is that
the effect of population on in-migration is larger than on out-migration.
Particularly, the 1.0 percent increase in population results in a rise of 0.46
and 0.70 percent in migration inflow in Models 1 and 2, respectively; in
contrast, a 1.0 increase in population results in an increase of about 0.3
percent in migration outflow in both of the models.
As documented in Panel 2 of Table 3, the variables modeling the dif-
ferential expected income show that as in China (Lin et al., 2004), income is
a significant driver of migration flows in Vietnam. Notably, the estimation
result from the quadratic specification of income is very much in line with
theoretical predictions. Income has a U-shaped relationship with both in-
migration and out-migration. The marginal effects of income are smaller at
origin than at destination in both models, leading to the smaller minimum
income thresholds24 at origin of VND 545 or 448 thousand (relative to VND
558 or 591 thousand at destination) in Models 1 and 2 respectively.25 Put
differently, the income at destination is predicted to exert its migration-
pulling effect after these thresholds. Similarly, while the liquidity constraint
effect at origin dominates before these income thresholds and restrains out-
migration, the push effect prevails after the threshold and stimulates greater
migration outflow.
Urban unemployment rates as a proxy for the probability of finding
employment are found to have sizable effects on migration flows. Higher
unemployment is predicted to generate more out-migrants. According to
Model 2, a 1.0 percentage point increase in the urban unemployment rate is
22 The elasticity of distance found in migration studies for countries with similar size as
Vietnam is, in order of magnitude, -0.69 for the United Kingdom (Wall, 2001), -0.99 for Sweden
(Westerlund, 1998), -1.7 for Poland (Ghatak et al., 2008), and -3.1 for the Philippines (Cruz et
al.,1988).
23 The elasticity is -0.55 for Canada (Day and Winer, 2006), -0.87 for Russia (Andrienko and
Guriev, 2004), and -1.2 for China (Shen, 1999).
24 For instance, the minimum income threshold is computed by exp.
25 The average exchange rates in 2004 and 2005 were between VND 15,740 and 15,859 to a
US dollar, respectively (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). Thus, VND 545,000 is, for instance,
about USD 34.6
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TABLE 3
MIGRATION RESULTS ESTIMATED WITH 2SLS AND ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONS 2004-2005
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF MIGRATION FLOWS
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
“Gravity” variables
Log of distance (km) -0.2890 -11.57 *** -0.2939 -12.49 ***
Log of total population at origin i 0.3334 1.74 * 0.3093 3.76 ***
Log of total population
at destination j 0.4629 3.25 *** 0.7016 7.79 ***
Expected income differential variables
Log of average monthly income i -26.0786 -2.32 ** -20.1864 -1.65 *
Squared log of average income i 2.0693 2.47 ** 1.6529 1.82 *
Log of average monthly income j -39.0723 -4.62 *** -33.9913 -3.62 ***
Squared log of average income j 3.0890 4.84 *** 2.6628 3.74 ***
Urban unemployment rates (%) i 1.2913 2.06 ** 0.2594 2.01 **
Urban unemployment rates (%) j 1.0597 2.11 ** 0.2457 2.32 **
(Log of) shares of urban population i -0.7568 -2.87 *** -0.0130 -1.22
(Log of) shares of urban population j -0.3717 -1.60 0.0155 1.98 *
Log of industrial output per capita i -0.0352 -0.38 -0.0670 -0.56
Log of industrial output per capita j 0.0499 0.76 0.0059 0.07
(Log of) shares of population in
industrial firms i 0.0939 1.56 0.0077 1.34
(Log of) shares of population in
industrial firms i 0.1769 3.14 *** 0.0334 6.21 ***
Log of agricultural output per capita i 0.4107 2.92 *** 0.3589 1.92 *
Log of agricultural output per capita j 0.7603 6.20 *** 0.8362 5.66 ***
“Tiebout” variables
Log of total public expenditures
per capita i 0.0317 0.18 0.0880 0.34
Log of total public expenditures
per capita j -0.0930 -0.75 -0.0025 -0.01
(Log of) student performance
index i -1.1533 -2.27 ** -0.0059 -1.16
(Log of) student performance
index j -0.4926 -0.90 0.0069 1.14
Log of medical staff
per thousand people i -0.8524 -3.60 *** -0.3059 -2.48 **
Log of medical staff
per thousand people j -0.7210 -0.27 -0.1072 -0.89
Log of telephone sets
per thousand people i 0.0685 0.34 -0.1152 -0.58
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Log of telephone sets
per thousand people j 0.3122 2.05 ** 0.1558 1.03
Demographic variables
(Log of) percent of ethnic
minority people i -0.0129 -0.47 -0.0011 -0.33
(Log of) percent of ethnic
minority people j -0.0660 -3.11 *** -0.0125 -5.19 ***
(Log of) percent of
college graduates i 0.0871 1.14 0.0211 1.00
(Log of) percent of
college graduates j 0.3261 4.69 *** 0.0209 1.09
(Log of) percent of
senior citizens i -0.0914 -0.66 -0.0031 -0.21
(Log of) percent of
senior citizens j -0.3699 -2.50 ** -0.0428 -2.61 ***
(Log of) percent of students i 0.2714 1.55 0.0490 3.03 ***
(Log of) percent of students j 0.3388 2.11 ** 0.0497 2.90 ***
Others
Time dummy (=1 if 2005) -0.2207 -2.51 -0.1574 -2.21
Constant 197.1020 4.07 161.4254 3.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.41
Hansen’s J statistic (overidentification
test of all instruments) 5.3 2.3
NOTES: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Model 1 is estimated with all variables in logarithmic specification. In Model 2,
variables in percentage terms were not log-transformed. Variables in italics were
treated as endogenous in the estimation model. The instruments for the income
variables in logarithmic terms are the logged average monthly income of govern-
ment agencies and their squared values in places of origin and destination. The
instruments used for unemployment rates were the log of intergovernmental
transfers per capita and the indexes of government efforts in labor training.
TABLE 3 continuation
MIGRATION RESULTS ESTIMATED WITH 2SLS AND ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONS 2004-2005
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF MIGRATION FLOWS
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
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associated with a rise of 26 percent in out-migration, which indicates that
Vietnamese migrants are quite sensitive to unemployment at home. The
unemployment rates also have a significant effect on migration inflows.
Higher unemployment at destination attracts more in-migrants. Although
contrary to theoretical predictions, this positive effect is reinforced by
findings from other studies and has a set of potential explanations. First, the
positive effect of unemployment rates at destination on in-migration was
found in earlier migration studies (Greenwood, 1969; Wadycki, 1974).
Second, there exists a popular perception among Vietnamese people of
better life in cities than in rural areas. This mindset is suggested by sayings
such as “It is better to be poor in the city than rich in the countryside” (Giau
nha que khong bang ngoi le thanh pho) (White et al., 2001). Third, migrants
may base their moving decision on lagged information and limited feed-
back. Therefore, they migrate to a place that has low unemployment and this
leads to higher unemployment in the current periods. All these reasons
indicate the interaction between unemployment and migration flows, which
justifies our use of the specifications with instruments for unemployment
rates in the first place, though further research could help provide more
insight into this result.
In addition to income and unemployment, several of the variables
modeling the probability of getting a job have substantial impact on in-
migration and out-migration. Since highly urbanized provinces increase
migrants’ chances to find employment in the modern sector, migrants are
attracted to, and show an inclination to stay in, more urbanized provinces.
However, urbanization is only significant at origin in Model 1 and at
destination in Model 2. Also, although the magnitude of the industrial
sector measured in its total output per capita has no significant impact on
in-migration, provinces with a higher share of population working in
industrial firms attract more in-migrants. Specifically, a 1.0 percentage
point rise in this population share is predicted to lead to a 3.34 percent
decline in out-migration. Combining this finding with the previous insig-
nificant result of the industrial output on in-migration, it seems that while
migrants seem to be indifferent to provinces with multiple high-tech labor-
saving firms, they prove to be more attracted to destinations with a high
concentration of labor–intensive firms. This migration pattern indicates
that the large majority of in-migrants are rural laborers. These laborers
possess the skill levels better-suited for more labor-intensive than knowl-
edge-intensive jobs (Li, 1996).
Provinces with a relatively larger agricultural sector can also send more
out-migrants. Again, this finding supports the hypothesis that the majority
of the migrants are rural laborers. Those provinces are also a draw of in-
migrants. This can be explained on two counts. First, in the initial stage of
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their moving,26 migrants tend to spend a certain period of time in either the
“urban traditional” sector or their familiar sector of agriculture. Second,
some migrants may want to leave for a different province for other reasons
than economic purposes. In these cases, they would be as happy about
farming in the new province as they are about farming in their home town.
We also find some empirical evidence for the Tiebout hypothesis in
which people “vote with their feet,” shopping around for provinces that
offer higher-quality public services and infrastructure. Better education
outputs are expected to stimulate more in-migration and discourage out-
migration. While better student performance does not appear to be a  strong
factor attracting in-migration in the empirical results, the higher quality of
public education at home proves to be an important factor for people to stay
in Model 1. Health care infrastructure is found to be a substantial retainer
of potential migrants. Having an additional one percent of medical staff per
thousand people can lead to a 0.85 or 0.31 percent reduction in out-migrants
in Models 1 and 2, respectively. Additonally, we find evidence that the
differential in the quality of infrastructure represented by the number of
telephone sets per thousand population proves to be more of a significant
incentive for people to migrate than to stay.
The demographic characteristics of provinces are found to influence
migration flows. For instance, provinces with a higher concentration of
ethnic minority people and senior citizens have lower in-migration. A 1.25
or 4.3 percent decline in in-migration flows is associated with a one-
percentage point increase in ethnic minority people or senior citizens,
respectively. This may well be indicative of the fact that while Vietnamese
is the country’s official language, it is spoken mostly by the Kinh ethnic
group. A small share of the other 53 ethnic groups can speak Vietnamese.
Language and other potential cultural differences can be attributed to the
negative and significant relationship between the share of the non-Kinh
population and in-migration.
Policy Implications
Vietnam was not successful in its policy to directly affect migration. It is
currently experiencing rapid migration without policies specifically en-
couraging it. To the extent that the government wants to influence the flow
of people, this study provides new insight into possible policy options.  Like
26 Todaro (1969:139) describes migration as a two-stage process where in the second stage
the migrant lands a more permanent job in the industrial or service sectors.
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many social phenomena, internal migration has both benefits and costs.
Migration can help poorer rural people find employment that they would
never have otherwise. However, it has also been argued that migration will
generally lead to an inefficient allocation of labor across provinces (Boadway
and Flatters, 1982) and create negative externalities such as congestion,
pollution, and overcrowded housing in major cities (Schroeder and Smoke,
2003). In that light, the government should come up with a coordinated
intervention plan on migration  that will take full advantage of its benefits
and minimize its associated costs.
The paper’s econometric results provide evidence that can be used   by
policymakers to influence migration. While noting that migrants are in fact
a highly heterogeneous group with different reasons and incentives to leave
or stay, our estimation results reveal broad patterns in the incentive struc-
ture facing migrants. The findings that both sending and receiving prov-
inces’ characteristics matter in determining the flow of migrants between
them indicate the need to implement multiple policies at sending and
receiving provinces simultaneously. The study’s empirical findings suggest
that it is critical to reduce unemployment in source regions if out-migration
is to be reduced. Integrated rural development can be  vital in reducing
unemployment. More investment in job creation in source provinces can
increase surplus rural laborers’ chances to earn extra payment, thus moti-
vating them to stay. Investing more in rural infrastructure and public
services is key to a rise in overall income of the rural population (Fan and
Zhang, 2004), thus reducing out-migration. Inter-provincial disparity in the
provision of public services can be narrowed with more equalization
transfers to deprived areas, thus yielding efficiency gains in reduced
negative externalities in urban areas (Shroeder and Smoke, 2003). More
specifically, improvements in health care and education services are likely
to cause potential rural migrants to stay put.
At destination, the government has to strike a balance between ensuring
migrants’ access to basic services and protecting their fundamental rights,
and refraining from sending misleading signals that may promote in-
migration. More importantly, whether enacted in  destination or source
provinces, all of the policies should be carried out in a coordinated way.
Dang et al. (2003) noted the lack of coordination among different minis-
terial agencies, departments and other institutions currently responsible for
one or more aspects of migration in the implementation of migration-
related policies.
Conclusions
This paper makes two major contributions to the migration literature in
terms of the datasets and policy-relevant estimation approach. The paper
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was the first to use the annual survey data on migration published by the
General Statistics Office of Vietnam. It also adopted a functional form to
accommodate the flexibility of income’s elasticity. Income, together with
urban unemployment rates, were endogenously estimated with instru-
ments that proved to be strong and valid. The inclusion of policy-relevant
variables provided empirical findings that can make migration policy in
Vietnam better-informed.
Our estimation model provided strong evidence on several important
factors influencing inter-provincial migration flows in Vietnam. They are
determined primarily by moving costs, expected income differentials,
disparity in the quality of public services offered by provinces, and the
demographic composition at destination and source. Contrary to migrants
in other countries, Vietnamese people were much less sensitive to distance.
While an increase in provinces’ expected income can stimulate in-migration
and discourage out-migration, this mechanism did not occur linearly. The
rise in income is expected to reach certain thresholds, at both origin and
destination, for migrants to make a move. Unlike other countries, migrants
were found to be more sensitive to unemployment at home than at destina-
tion. They were also more attracted to places offering public services and
infrastructure of  better quality. In general, relative to internal migrants in
other countries, inter-provincial migrants in Vietnam exhibited both similar
and dissimilar behavioral responses to those factors in their decision  to stay
or to move.
This paper’s findings provide new insights for migration policy options
and suggest that the government adopts a holistic policy approach to
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs associated with internal
migration. While the paper looked into inter-provincial migration, future
research into intra-provincial migration, data permitting, is warranted.
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